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Introduction
STUDENT-ATHLETES who demonstrate the skills and dedication
throughout their college careers that predict success in professional
sports become attractive prospects for major league drafts. Yet their
professional aspirations can be significantly affected by the departure
of their college coaches, whose team’s recurring success often results
in lucrative offers from professional teams or wealthier and more suc-
cessful college programs. Although the potential harm to a university
left behind by an upwardly-mobile coach is often recognized, less at-
tention has focused on the connection between a coach’s departure
from the university and the student-athlete’s standing in the National
Football League (“NFL”) draft. A recent study has demonstrated that
a coach’s decision to leave a university can substantially lower an ath-
lete’s position in the draft.1
Each year, a large number of football programs face coaching
changes;2 indeed, a top school’s hiring away a coach from another
program often has a ripple effect-–a “coaching carousel.”3 Student-
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1. See Philip L. Hersch, Does the NCAA Coaching Carousel Hamper the Professional Pros-
pects of College Football Recruits?, 13 J. SPORTS ECON. 23–30 (2012).
2. See id. at 21 (stating that the median number of coaching changes per year is
between 18 and 22).
3. For example, after the 2012 football season the California Golden Bears fired Jeff
Tedford and hired Sonny Dykes from Louisiana Tech, who replaced Dykes with Skip Holtz
from South Florida, who replaced Holtz with Willie Taggart from Western Kentucky, who
replaced Taggart with Bobby Petrino, who was fired by Arkansas following the 2011 season.
Arkansas in turn, fired its interim coach and hired Bret Bielema from Wisconsin, and Wis-
consin thereafter hired Gary Andersen from Utah State. The carousel only ended because
Utah State hired its own offensive coordinator. See Walker Resigns From NMSU, COL-
LEGEFOOTBALLPOLL.COM (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/coaching_
changes.html.
709
710 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
athletes with professional football aspirations would be well served by
developing a strategy to protect them from the significant risk that the
coaching carousel will adversely affect their collegiate and profes-
sional careers. Such a strategy would also benefit the fans and stake-
holders of their alma mater, who suffer as well when their favored
program is harmed by the annual coaching carousel among big-time
college coaches.
This Article suggests that student-athletes can protect themselves
(and, indirectly, fans and students at the university at which they are
about to enroll), by securing a binding promise from the coach that
he will not voluntarily leave the university throughout the student-ath-
lete’s career. This promise could be in a legally binding contract di-
rectly between the coach and student-athlete, or by adding to the
coach’s employment contract with the university a proviso expressly
designating student-athletes as third party beneficiaries. Part I briefly
describes problems resulting from the coaching carousel and de-
scribes the potential for contracts that limit a coach’s mobility to mini-
mize harmful effects on student-athletes. Part II explains why
contracts in which the coach agrees to provide unique sports services
are legally enforceable and how contracts can effectively bind a coach
through the issuance of a negative injunction. Part III analyzes the
bargaining dynamics between coaches, universities, and star athletes,
and concludes that the requisite dynamics are likely present in some
cases to successfully negotiate each of the contracts. Finally, Part IV
discusses why current National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) rules should be interpreted to permit voluntary contracts,
enforceable by the student-athlete, that limit a coach’s ability to termi-
nate his coaching contract and accept an offer that advances his own
professional aspirations at the expense of students who relied on his
tutelage to develop their own careers.
I. The Coaching Carousel
A. Problems Student-Athletes Face when Forced to Ride the
Coaching Carousel
Upon completion of each NCAA college football season, a signifi-
cant number of coaches leave their respective universities. Although
some are dismissed by their employer for on- or off-field failures,
many leave voluntarily for a more prestigious position.4 This frequent
4. See Hersch, supra note 1, at 20.
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exchanging of coaches has been dubbed the “coaching carousel.”5
Over a period of ten years, from 2000–2009, 190 head coaching
changes occurred at Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly Division I-A)
schools6 and the coaching carousel continues to spin today. One de-
monstrable problem with the coaching carousel is its detrimental ef-
fects on college athletes.7 In addition to intangible problems caused
by the additional time involved in learning a new playbook (given the
severe time constraints facing many student-athletes), and the anxiety
of developing a new relationship with a new set of coaches (given the
huge role that these relationships play in the student-athlete’s initial
selection of a college), a coaching change during a student athlete’s
career drops the average player’s NFL draft pick by nearly two-thirds
of a round.8 A drop in draft stock occurs regardless of whether the
coach was fired or exited the university voluntarily.9 Additionally, pro-
fessional teams are more attracted to players originating from pro-
grams with solid coaching reputations.10
Because a young NFL player’s compensation is primarily deter-
mined by draft position, a later round draft pick can result in the loss
of millions of dollars in guaranteed compensation and signing bo-
nuses.11 Aside from a potentially substantial drop in future earnings, a
coach’s departure can result in more immediate consequences for the
student-athlete. For example, a student-athlete may experience diffi-
culty adjusting to a new leadership style. Additionally, a coach’s depar-
ture can create a lack of trust, the loss of a support system, and
5. Id. at 20–21.
6. Id. at 21.
7. But cf. Joshua R. Pate, Sarah E. Stokowski & Robin Hardin, Third Time’s a Charm:
The Case of Tennessee’s Four Junior Football Players who Endured Three Different Head Coaches in
Three Seasons, 4 J. ISSUES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 354, 361 (2011) (suggesting that, in
some cases, coaching changes during a student-athlete’s college career may help prepare
the player for the NFL by forcing him to adapt to different coaching techniques since the
athlete will likely experience multiple coaching changes while playing in the NFL, while
recognizing that college coaching changes cause more harmful effects than beneficial
effects).
8. See Hersch, supra note 1, at 22, 30.
9. Id. at 30.
10. See Recruiting & Developing NFL Draft Picks – 2012 Review, The College Football
Matrix Blog, http://collegefootballmatrix.wordpress.com/special-features/articles-2/the-
bestworst-of-recruiting-developing-nfl-draft-picks/recruiting-developing-nfl-draft-picks-
2012-update/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (stating that “[o]f the 192 total picks in the 2012
draft, 166 came from teams with winning records in 2011”).
11. See Hersch, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that the 2009 draft’s median guaranteed
money was $10.1 million for a first round draft pick compared to $1.91 million for a sec-
ond round draft pick).
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alterations in the training environment.12 Moreover, a student-athlete
who selected a college based on the presence of a coaching style that
emphasizes preparedness for professional sports may find his expecta-
tions are not achieved if the new coach has a different style (even if
equally successful in winning college games).13
Coaching changes are particularly unfair to student-athletes who
base their decisions to attend an institution on the presence of a par-
ticular coach.14 Although traditional students basing their matricula-
tion decisions on the presence of a particular professor would
experience similar inequities in the event the professor left for
greener pastures during the students’ academic careers, the NCAA’s
transfer rules exacerbate the problem as it applies to student-ath-
letes.15 After student-athletes commit to an institution, the NCAA sig-
nificantly inhibits transfers by making student-athletes ineligible to
play for their new universities for the season immediately following a
transfer.16
B. Methods for Lessening the Harm
While the NCAA restrains the movement of players, coaches are
seemingly free to change positions relatively free of consequences.17 If
12. Pate, Stokowski & Hardin, supra note 7, at 354.
13. See, e.g., Sanjay Kirpalani, Alabama Football: “Saban Effect” Gives Tide Players an Edge
in NFL Draft, BLEACHER REPORT (May 8, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1177327-alabama-football-saban-effect-gives-tide-players-an-edge-in-nfl-draft (arguing that
Saban’s NFL coaching experience and “pro-type culture” heavily contributed to four of his
Alabama players receiving first round draft picks for two consecutive years).
14. See Hersch, supra note 1, at 21.
15. See id. at 21. NCAA men’s basketball teams are also affected by the frequent ex-
change of coaches. Fifty head coaching changes are in place for the 2012–2013 men’s
basketball season at Division I schools. See NCAA Division I Coaching Changes, ESPN (Jun. 22,
2012, 3:05 PM), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/7647785/ncaa-
division-coaching-changes-2012-13-season.
16. See NCAA BYLAWS, art. 14, § 14.5.1 [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS], reprinted in NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2011–12 DIVISION I NCAA MANUAL 173 [hereinafter NCAA
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D113.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Bill Brubaker, Departed Coaches, Deserted Recruits – Recruits Are Jilted By
Coaches in Search of Greener Pastures, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 2, 1998), http://community.seat-
tletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19980802&slug=2764305 (highlighting the per-
ceived unfairness of the restrictions on players’ movement compared to the limitless
mobility of coaches). In many cases, a coach’s contract gives him the right to terminate
with the payment of a fee to the current employer easily borne by the coach or his new
employer. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Tax Consequences When A New Employer
Bears the Cost of the Employee’s Terminating A Prior Employment Relationship, 8 FLA. TAX REV.
539, 540 (2007). Even where a contract’s terms make it difficult for a coach to leave, uni-
versity presidents often grant permission to leave. See, e.g., Beilein Settles Buyout with West
Virginia for $1.5 Million, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
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future college athletes aspire to play for a professional team, adopting
measures to protect themselves from harm caused by frequent coach-
ing changes is in their self-interest. At first glance, the clear answer
may be to simply adopt the solution invoked by non-athlete students.
In academia, if a student selects an institution based on a particular
professor and that professor leaves for another university, the student
may follow the instructor by transferring to the new institution with-
out penalty so long as she is qualified to attend the transferee school.
However, this solution is undesirable in college sports because it
would result in the institution not only losing its coach, but all of its
star players as well, intensifying the harm to the school and athletic
program. Furthermore, most athletes sign a National Letter of Intent
(“NLI”), which requires them to play at the institution for one year
along with an additional one or two year penalty for transferring.18
Between the restrictions imposed by current NCAA transfer rules and
NLI, and the harmful consequences to the university, encouraging
student-athletes to follow their coaches to the new institutions is not a
viable solution.
Similarly, informal promises communicated by the coach or uni-
versity are just as ineffective because actions brought by students to
enforce these “promises” have proved consistently unsuccessful, either
because there was no evidence of the actual promise, or because the
written scholarship contract contained no evidence of the oral prom-
ise, or because the “promise” is not the sort of pledge that most peo-
ple would take as a binding pledge.19 Although representatives of the
college/mensbasketball/2007-04-26-beilein-buyout_N.htm (West Virginia University
agreed to reduce the buyout clause in John Beilein’s contract by $1 million after he an-
nounced that he was leaving the University five years before his contract was set to expire).
18. See Michael J. Riella, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying the Doctrines of Unconscionabil-
ity and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete Intent Under the National Letter of Intent,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2181, 2187 (2002). Schools only agree to honor promises of an
athletic scholarship to students who sign a letter of intent. See About the National Letter of
Intent (NLI), NAT’L LETTER OF INTENT, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/nli/nli/
about+the+nli/index.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
19. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that stu-
dents must identify a specific contractual promise that the University “failed to honor”);
Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946–47 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding
that the language of the written contract controls, regardless of any additional promises
not in writing); Soderbloom v. Yale Univ., No. CV-91-0324553 S, 1992 WL 24448, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1992) (holding that students must identify a specific contractual
provision that the University breached if their claim is to prevail); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL.,
SPORTS AND THE LAW 866–67 (4th ed. 2011) (describing unsuccessful litigation by Bryan
Fortay to enforce oral promise by Miami Hurricanes Head Coach Dennis Erickson to start
him at quarterback); Riella, supra note 18, at 2188–92 (discussing the cases in which courts
have held that oral representations and implied promises are separate from written con-
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university’s athletic department often issue verbal assurances to in-
duce prospective athletes to attend their university, courts have con-
sistently held that oral and implied promises made by the coach or
university are unenforceable.20 Thus, student-athletes cannot safely
rely on oral or implied assurances regarding continued instruction by
a specific coach, guaranteed playing time, or any other aspect of their
college careers, because such promises are not binding.
More workable solutions include a contract between the coach
and university in which the coach promises not to voluntarily leave the
school, or a contract between the coach and student in which the
coach promises to remain at the university throughout the student’s
career. If entered voluntarily, these contracts are both legally binding
and beneficial to the university. They protect student-athletes while
allowing the school to retain its coach and prized players by reducing
coaching turnover. Of course, these solutions are unachievable unless
the requisite bargaining dynamics are present and unless these op-
tions are available to coaches and student-athletes at schools seeking
to comply with NCAA regulations.
II. The Solution: Contracts that Limit a Coach’s Ability to
Leave the University Voluntarily
A. Contract Between the Coach and Student-Athlete
The most straightforward solution is a contract between a stu-
dent-athlete and coach. In return for the student-athlete’s agreement
to enroll at the coach’s school, the coach would promise to continue
his employment with the university throughout the student’s career,
meaning that the coach could not voluntarily accept another head
coaching position, even if offered a more preferable position else-
where. Where necessary, the coach may wish to create an exception
permitting him to leave under specially designated circumstances—
such as the opportunity to coach in the NFL or at other universities
with some particular attraction.21 Such a contract would recite the
tracts); James Kennedy Ornstein, Broken Promises and Broken Dreams: Should We Hold College
Athletic Programs Accountable for Breaching Representations Made in Recruiting Student-Athletes?, 6
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 641, 641–47 (overviewing the breach of contractual duty cases
between student and university).
20. Stacey Meyer, Comment, Unequal Bargaining Power: Making the National Letter of
Intent More Equitable, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 227, 227 (explaining that coaches and repre-
sentatives of the institution make a myriad of promises to recruit prospective athletes that
often fail to come to fruition).
21. The contractual promise discussed in this Part would not apply where unexpected
circumstances, such as illness, rendered the coach incapable of performing his duties
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unique qualities of the coach and the unavailability of money damages
as adequate compensation in case of breach.
In addition to offer and acceptance, the main requirement to cre-
ate an enforceable contract between coach and student-athlete is that
the agreement be supported by consideration or a consideration sub-
stitute.22 An agreement is supported by consideration when the par-
ties have engaged in a bargained-for exchange.23 In this case, a
student presenting the possibility of a contract to a prospective coach
in exchange for the student’s matriculation to the institution consti-
tutes an offer.24 If the coach demonstrates willingness to agree to the
terms of the contract, he has accepted the student’s offer.25 Under
this scenario, a contract between a coach and student-athlete is sup-
ported by consideration because both parties participated in a bar-
gained-for exchange. The coach foregoes his right to quit coaching
for the university in exchange for the star player’s promise to enroll in
the coach’s university and commitment to contribute to the team
throughout his career. Thus, if both parties voluntarily consent, the
contract is legally enforceable, provided that NCAA rules do not bar
the agreement.
Liquidated damages, however, are not an adequate remedy in
this context. While a liquidated damages clause that reflects an upper-
limit on a reasonable estimation of the financial harm (both to the
student-athlete’s professional opportunities as well as the harm to the
university) could in theory be constructed, thereby making it finan-
cially difficult for a new team to lure the coach away,26 it cannot rem-
under the contract. In such a case, the coach could assert the defense of impracticability,
which relieves parties of their duty to perform contractual obligations when doing so is not
possible. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DISCHARGE BY SUPERVENING IMPRACTI-
CABILITY § 261 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DEATH OR INCAPACITY OF
PERSON NECESSARY FOR PERFORMANCE § 262 (1981). Such a defense would not be applica-
ble, however, if the coach simply wished to retire or accept a position elsewhere. Id. § 261
cmt. d (1981) (explaining that the party asserting the defense must show that, by no fault
of his own, performing his duty under the contract is highly impractical).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF EXCHANGE; TYPES OF EX-
CHANGE § 71 (1981).
23. Id.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: OFFER DEFINED § 24 (1981).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER DEFINED; AC-
CEPTANCE BY PERFORMANCE; ACCEPTANCE BY PROMISE § 50 (1981).
26. Liquidated damage clauses are enforceable when (1) damages would otherwise be
difficult to calculate and (2) the amount must be reasonable (close to the amount of actual
damages). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTIES
§ 356 (1981). Assuming that a player would have turned pro, $1 million might superficially
appear to be a reasonable liquidated damages clause, because it reflects the actual amount
that the player would lose. However, including a $1 million liquidated damages clause in
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edy the breach because the NCAA would likely bar an athlete from
receiving payment pursuant to such a clause.
B. Contract Between the Coach and University
A second option to reduce coaching turnover is to declare stu-
dent-athletes to be third-party beneficiaries of a provision in a coach’s
employment contract with the university. This option may be feasible
when a university has an institutional interest in recruiting a student-
athlete on the basis of the promised unique tutelage from a particular
coach. Similar agreements to provide unique services prohibiting em-
ployees from performing similar services for anyone but the con-
tracting employer are commonplace for professional athletes27 and
entertainers.28 Unique service contracts are frequently implemented
in the sports and entertainment industries because athletic and en-
tertainment skills are of such a unique nature that employers would
experience difficulty and sometimes even impossibility finding
replacements.29 A promise to provide exclusive services as a stipula-
every player contract is problematic because (while damages are difficult to estimate be-
cause of the uncertainty of a professional career), if the player did not have the ability to
turn pro, the liquidated damages clause would likely be deemed a penalty clause (since the
estimated damages are so much higher than actual damages) and penalty clauses are unen-
forceable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTIES
§ 356, cmt. b (1981).
27. See, e.g., Winnipeg Rugby Football Club, Ltd. v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D.
Ohio 1955) (holding that where football player was of peculiar and particular value to his
employer, a preliminary injunction was appropriate); Weirmuller v. Stone, 3 Pa. D. & C.
165 (Pa. C.P. 1923) (holding that where a boxer’s services were of a unique character and
the employer would have difficulty finding a substitute, an injunction was warranted).
28. See, e.g., Winter Garden Co. v. Smith, 282 F. 166 (2d Cir. 1922) (holding that a
comedian’s reputation, personality, and ability to attract large audiences made him unique
so that the employer was entitled to an injunction); Pike Rollarena, Inc. v. Clark, 54 Pa. D.
& C.2d 25 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (holding that organist was of special skill and not easily replacea-
ble, which justified an injunction).
29. A typical provision is found in Clause 4(a) of the Major League (Baseball) Uni-
form Player’s Contract:
The Player represents and agrees that he has exception and unique skill and abil-
ity as a baseball player; that this services to be rendered hereunder are of a spe-
cial, unusual, and extraordinary character which gives them peculiar value which
cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated for in damages at law, and that
the Player’s breach of this contract will cause the Club great and irreparable in-
jury and damage. The Player agrees that, in addition to other remedies, the Club
shall be entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent a breach of
this contract by the Player, including, among others, the right to enjoin the Player
from playing baseball for any other person or organization during the term of
this contract.
Major League (Baseball) Uniform Player’s Contract, reprinted in PAUL C. WEILER ET AL.,
DOCUMENTS AND STATUTORY SUPPLEMENTS TO SPORTS AND THE LAW 182–83 (4th ed. 2011);
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tion to an employment contract meets the basic requirement of con-
sideration because the coach agrees to render unique sports services
in exchange for compensation and other benefits provided by the uni-
versity. Adding student-athletes as third-party beneficiaries is impor-
tant, however, because university presidents and athletic directors
have proven to be lax in their willingness to enforce their contract
rights vis-a`-vis coaches.
1. The Law of Employment Contracts
At common law, employment is at will, meaning that either party
may terminate the employment relationship at any point without
cause.30 The employer and employee can agree upon a contract that
modifies the at-will relationship.31 Specifically, the parties may decide
to include additional protections against the discharge of an em-
ployee, beyond what is provided by employment at will, such as requir-
ing just cause for firing.32 Since most employees are easily replaceable,
usual damages for breach of an employment agreement is the cost of
finding a new employee, which includes incidental damages, such as
advertising, interviewing, and training costs, plus any additional salary
that the employer must pay the new employee if wages have increased
over the contract term.33
Conversely, in industries where employees offer unique skills and
are extremely difficult to replace, equitable relief is available for
breach of an employment contract.34 Courts will not order specific
performance of the contract, but will issue negative injunctions bar-
ring employees from providing the same services to rival employers if
the employment contract states that the employee agrees to provide
see also Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1921); Harry Rogers Theat-
rical Enters. v. Comstock, 232 N.Y.S. 1, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
30. See Skinner v. Maritz, Inc., 253 F.3d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 2001) (employers may dis-
charge at-will employees without cause); Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Lubbock,
Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1050 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the overwhelming majority of
states recognize the traditional common law doctrine of employment at-will”).
31. See, e.g., Saperstone v. Airport Group Int’l, Inc., 02-CV-6354 CJS(F), 2003 WL
21730710 (W.D.N.Y. June 6, 2003) (interpreting an employment contract that modified
the at-will relationship).
32. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980)
(“[A] provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not be dis-
charged except for cause is legally enforceable . . . .”).
33. See Valentine Dolls, Inc. v. McMillan, 202 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960);
Peters v. Whitney, 23 Barb. 24, 25 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1856).
34. See Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827, 832 (2d Cir. 1921); Am. Broad.
Companies, Inc. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366–67 (N.Y. 1981); Zomba Recording LLC v.
Williams, 839 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
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special or unique services or has extraordinary qualifications.35 An in-
junction is necessary when deprivation of an employee’s unique ser-
vices would result in irreparable harm to the employer.36 The
injunction serves to ensure that the employee cannot shirk the bar-
gain inherent in a long-term contract, which assures the employee of
the promised salary even if best efforts result in a decline in skill or
performance, but assures employers that they can receive the em-
ployee’s services even if they turn out to be more valuable than esti-
mated over the course of the contract term. Even if a negative
injunction is not expressly provided for in the contract, courts will
often infer that an agreement to work for an organization is an im-
plied promise not to perform the same services for a competitor.37
When a contract stipulates that a professional athlete provides
special services, the team is entitled to seek an injunction if the athlete
attempts to play for another team during the contract term.38 In fact,
almost all major league athletes are required to sign a provision stipu-
lating that they offer unique skills and are irreplaceable.39 These per-
sonal service agreements afford employers much needed protection
in circumstances where the services provided by employees cannot be
duplicated by others.40
The historic case of Lumley v. Wagner41 established a precedent
for courts of equity to enforce unique service agreements when dam-
ages would be inadequate by enjoining an employee from providing
similar services to another employer. In Lumley, an opera star
breached a personal service agreement with her employer when she
35. See Shubert Theatrical Co., 271 F. at 832; Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 420 N.E.2d at
366–67; Zomba Recording LLC, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
36. See Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 434 F. Supp. 449, 452
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting an injunction against the defendant boxer and in favor the
plaintiff, a promoter of boxing matches, on the grounds that the plaintiff’s credibility
within the industry would suffer irreparable harm if the boxer failed to fulfill his
obligations).
37. See, e.g., Cort v. Lassard, 22 P. 1054, 1056 (Or. 1889) (contract stipulating that
employee provided unique services need not contain a negative clause in order for a court
of equity to exercise jurisdiction in deciding whether employer is entitled to equitable
relief when employees left for a competitor).
38. See, e.g., Winnipeg Rugby Football Club, Ltd. v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D.
Ohio 1955).
39. See Sharon F. Carton, Damning with Fulsome Praise: Assessing the Uniqueness of an
Artist or Performer as a Condition to Enjoin Performance of Personal Service Contracts in Entertain-
ment Law, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 197, 209 (1998).
40. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Boxing, 434 F. Supp. at 452 (in enforcing a personal
service agreement, the court granted a negative injunction where the defendant breached
an agreement to box Muhammad Ali).
41. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
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performed at a competing theater during the contract term.42 Al-
though the court’s order did not compel the singer to perform her
contractual duties, the court precluded her from performing in any
establishment but the first employer’s theater, reasoning that such an
order would encourage the opera star to fulfill her contractual duties
to the original employer since she could not sing elsewhere.43
The Lumley rule was notably extended to the context of sports
contracts in Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie.44 In Lajoie, a baseball player
breached his contract to compete for the Philadelphia Phillies when
he arranged to play for the cross-town rival, the Athletics. The court
granted an order prohibiting the Hall of Fame second baseman from
playing baseball for rival teams, holding that an injunction is war-
ranted even if the player is not impossible to replace, as long as the
same services are not easily obtainable from others.45 The court
pointed to several attributes, from the athlete’s high level of expertise
as a baseball player to his great reputation as a second baseman, in
determining that the player’s services were unique.46 The court also
considered the athlete’s relationship to his employer and determined
that, as an essential contributor to the team’s success, his withdrawal
from the team would undoubtedly weaken it and likely decrease game
attendance.47 The uniqueness inquiry focuses not only on the em-
ployee himself, but also on the employee’s connection to the em-
ployer’s business and the value of the employee’s services to the
operation.48
Courts have continued to order negative injunctions as a remedy
for breach of service contracts in the sports industry, finding that most
professional athletes’ services are unique and, therefore, not readily
replaceable. The court in Dallas Cowboys Football Club v. Harris49 held
that a football player with superior skill is unique (even though not
literally one-of-a-kind), in the sense that a club would have difficulty
42. Id. at 697–98.
43. Id. at 693.
44. 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
45. Id. at 973.
46. Id. at 974. The contract that the Phillies sought to enforce was a big victory for the
National League team to win over a star player from the then-rival American League. In
1901, Lajoie led the American League in runs, hits, doubles, home runs, total bases, runs
batted in, batting average, on base percentage, and slugging percentage. See WEILER, supra
note 29, at 99.
47. Id. at 974.
48. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1999).
49. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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obtaining a replacement.50 Similarly, the court in Central New York Bas-
ketball, Inc. v. Barnett51 determined that a basketball player’s services
were unique based on his unusual, crowd-pleasing ability as a ball han-
dler and further concluded that professional athletes in baseball, foot-
ball, and basketball leagues must demonstrate extraordinary talent or
they would not be employed in the profession.52
2. Coaching Contracts as Agreements to Provide Unique Services
Customarily, coaching contracts provide grounds for termination
by the coach53 as well as a provision allowing the university to termi-
nate the coach for just cause.54 Coaching contracts will often contain
buyout clauses under which the coach may leave the university before
his contract expires upon payment of a specified sum.55 However,
these clauses rarely prevent a coach who wishes to leave the university
from doing so because the buyout is usually too low to present a signif-
icant monetary obstacle.56 The relatively modest sums required are
often covered by the coach’s new employer.57 Significantly, few buyout
clauses cover the full harm to the university and its student-athletes
from the coach’s decision to accept other employment. From the stu-
dent-athlete’s perspective, absent a provision providing a specific pay-
out to each student-athlete on the team (which, as discussed below,58
is not realistic under NCAA regulations), the only approach to ensure
that a coach will remain loyal to his current university is through a
unique services provision in the employment contract that will justify
equitable relief to prevent breach of the promise during the stated
terms of the contract. Just as unique services agreements have been
successfully used to protect athletic clubs by prohibiting players from
switching to a rival team, these provisions can also effectively require
50. Id. at 45.
51. 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
52. Id. at 513-14.
53. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW: COACHING CON-
TRACTS § 16:8 (2011).
54. Christian Dennie, There Are No Handshake Deals in College Coaching Contracts, in 20
No. 1 ANDREWS ENT. INDUS. LITIG. REP. 2, 3 (2008).
55. Id. at 7.
56. See Clay Travis, Why Don’t College Coaches Have Non-Competes in Their Contracts?, OUT-
KICK THE COVERAGE (Dec. 2, 2011), http://outkickthecoverage.com/why-dont-college-
coaches-have-non-competes-in-their-contracts.php (suggesting that buyouts are not an ef-
fective substitute for non-compete clauses because, in most cases, buyouts do not deter
coaches from leaving their respective universities).
57. Dennie, supra note 54, at 7.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 113–15, 118.
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coaches to remain committed to their current universities while under
contract to do so.
As demonstrated in the Lajoie, Harris and Barnett cases, courts util-
ize the “difficulty of replacement” standard in determining the uni-
queness of sports professionals. Under this standard, coaches are
undoubtedly unique. A university has a legitimate, protectable busi-
ness interest in retaining its coach for the contracted term. Coaches
are privy to confidential information about recruits gained during
their employment, and in many cases the coach’s services are so suffi-
ciently distinctive, if not unique, that the university would have severe
difficulty finding a replacement.59 In addition to their primary role of
instructing athletes, coaches drive the success of athletic programs by
performing many functions for the university.60 Coaches are
recruiters, academic guidance counselors, fundraisers, advertisers,
and alumni coordinators.61 They are responsible for maintaining a
team of talented players and developing connections with recruits
who will eventually become assets to the university.62
Coaches provide unparalleled value to their respective universi-
ties by accomplishing far more than winning seasons.63 Aside from
being highly talented experts in their fields, coaches create a “brand”
for the university. The loyalty and commitment of many fans depends
on the coach, making it very difficult for the university to recreate its
brand and preserve loyalty after the coach leaves. A decline in the
team’s fan base can result in lower game attendance and a drop in
merchandise sales. Since athletic programs serve as a revenue genera-
tor for many universities,64 a successful coach is an invaluable re-
source. Given the unique benefits coaches provide for universities,
finding an equivalent successor is often extremely difficult.
An injunction would therefore be a viable remedy if a coach
breaches a contract with a student-athlete. At the time of breach, the
precise effect on the player is difficult to quantify: according to an
59. See Phila. Ball Club v. LaJoie, 51 A. 973, 974 (Pa. 1902) (“[The] services of the
[second baseman] are of such a unique character, and display such a special knowledge,
skill, and ability, as renders them of peculiar value to the [Phillies], and so difficult of
substitution that their loss will produce ‘irreparable injury’ . . . .”).
60. See CHAMPION, supra note 53, § 16:8.
61. See id.
62. Travis, supra note 56 (emphasizing the importance of coaches to their
universities).
63. See, e.g., Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical Perspec-
tive, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127, 152 (2001) (listing the vast duties of a typical college
basketball coach).
64. See id. 131–34.
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empirical study, the harm to the athlete, including reduced possibility
of being drafted at all or the precise number of draft slots that a player
that endured a coaching change will fall, is probabilistic within a
range.65 Damages calculations are further complicated by the need to
estimate lost income, endorsements, and other opportunities because
there is no method to predict how successful the athlete could have
been had the coach stayed. Indeed, a court is unlikely to award mone-
tary damages because the doctrine of uncertainty of harm limits dam-
ages that are too unpredictable to accurately calculate.66
Similarly, an injunction is an attainable remedy for the university
if a coach breaches the employment agreement. The university can
demonstrate that, due to the unique nature of the coach’s position
and near irreplaceability of his services, monetary damages would not
adequately compensate for the university’s loss. The university may
also recover from the institution attempting to lure the coach, on a
theory of tortious interference with existing contractual relations.67
Although this tort renders the defendant institution liable for eco-
nomic losses caused thereby, the same problems of damage estimation
that stymie the award of monetary relief directly from the coach would
ensue in a tort suit against the new employer.
3. Is the Contract Enforceable Under the Common Law
Reasonableness Test for Restrictive Covenants in
Restraint of Trade?
An agreement that limits the free movement of employees in
commerce is subject to claims of unenforceability as an unreasonable
restraint of trade. While a personal service contract between a coach
and university limits the coach’s ability to transfer freely during the
term of the contract, the agreement should be found to be reasonable
because the university provides substantial compensation to the coach
in return for unique services, and the university, its student-athletes,
and its fans (many of whom make substantial monetary commitments
to the university to secure season tickets) have a legitimate interest in
receiving the benefits of the coach’s talent which he has promised to
provide.
Nor is there any concern that these agreements are anticompeti-
tive. A coach with sufficient bargaining power remains free to find a
65. Hersch, supra note 1, at 25.
66. See Chi. Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 549–50 (1932).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PERFORM-
ANCE OF CONTRACT BY THIRD PERSON § 766 (1979).
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university willing to hire him without securing an enforceable promise
that he will fulfill the terms of his contract. He can also decline to
agree to a contract extension and seek employment elsewhere at the
end of his contract (although, as discussed below, there are business
reasons that discourage that practice). Competition for multi-year
contracts that the employer legitimately expects to be fulfilled is an
entirely procompetitive structure for an industry and these contracts
are not unreasonable restraints of trade.68
The common law doctrine of ancillary restraints has been assimi-
lated into the reasonable restraint of trade analysis.69 This doctrine is
most commonly applied in determining the enforceability of an em-
ployee’s promise not to compete with the employer after the termina-
tion of the existing employment contract. The court evaluates the
legitimate employer interests that would be harmed if the employee
were to compete, and employee’s legitimate interests, and the public
interest.70 Even when a non-compete clause is not explicitly included
in the contract, the reasonableness test still applies if the contract im-
poses a penalty on an employee for engaging in the same business
with another employer.71 Since a promise to render unique services
prevents an employee from performing the same services elsewhere,
the agreement must pass the reasonableness test for ancillary
restraints.
To the extent relevant for a court of equity, enforcement of the
agreement is likely to benefit the university’s interest in maintaining
fan loyalty, the interest of fans relying on coaching stability in purchas-
ing season tickets and, as noted earlier, protecting student-athletes’
careers. Coaching contracts as personal service agreements are rea-
sonable from a practical perspective to ensure that both parties, as
well as the public, receive the benefit of the bargain, and are therefore
distinguishable from the more controversial use of a non-compete
68. See Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that exclusive dealing contracts are lawful if limited to a year’s duration because
such contracts “can promote competition by making it feasible for firms to invest in pro-
moting their products—for these costs would not be recoverable if the contracts were of
very short terms, or if rivals could exhibit the same films and obtain the benefit of this
promotional activity”).
69. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 226 (1899).
70. See Bires v. WalTom, LLC, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2009); 6 WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 13:13 (4th ed. 2012).
71. See Bires, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (applying the reasonableness test even though
there was no covenant against competition in the racecar driver’s contract because the
driver was penalized for engaging in the same business with another employer); 6 WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 13:13 (4th ed. 2012).
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clause to limit an employee’s opportunities after the term of the em-
ployment contract expires.
C. Whether Contract Law can Effectively Bind a Coach Through
Viable Remedies
Monetary damages serve as the normal remedy for a breach of
contract.72 Estimating the monetary damages to universities, and in
particular to student-athletes as third-party beneficiaries, raises a myr-
iad of problems. Although traditional damage awards can compensate
a university for expenses such as search costs, transition expenses, and
potentially higher salaries necessary to immediately replace a depart-
ing coach, judges and juries would struggle to quantify the harm to
the university in terms of recruiting, athletic donations, and the eco-
nomic effect of a decline in team performance attributable to the
coach’s breach.
However, equitable relief is available when monetary damages are
not fully compensatory. Generally, an injunction is granted when, in
the absence of an injunction, irreparable harm would ensue.73 For
breach of a unique service agreement, courts will grant a negative in-
junction that restrains employees from performing their services else-
where to offset the harm to employers in finding a replacement.74
Even if the obstacles to ascertaining money damages could be
overcome,75 NCAA rules—which student-athletes cannot bargain to
overcome—likely preclude the payment of money to an elite student-
athlete for a coach’s contract breach.76 If bargaining dynamics could
lead coaches to compete with each other in offering credible promises
to remain at a school during a star student-athlete’s collegiate career,
the case for equitable relief seems particularly strong.
III. Bargaining Power
Contracts are voluntary bargains, so even if the laws of contract
and remedies and NCAA regulations permitted courts to enforce
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: JUDICIAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE § 345
cmt. b, (1981).
73. See supra Part II.B.1.
74. See Am. League Baseball Club of Chi. v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 8 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
75. In the event that an unusual University president authorized litigation to keep a
head coach from hopping on the coaching carousel, it is possible that, contrary to my
prediction in text, that improvements in damage estimation, or a liquidated damages
clause that fully compensated all those harmed by the coach’s departure, could lead a
judge to deny equitable relief because adequate damages could be awarded.
76. See infra Part IV.
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promises made by coaches to universities and student-athletes to re-
main at the school, the bargaining dynamics must be sufficient to in-
duce a coach to make such a promise. These dynamics are explored
below.
A. Bargaining Dynamics Between the Coach and Student-Athlete
The ability of parties to negotiate a contract depends on bargain-
ing dynamics.77 When one side has considerably more bargaining
power than the other, the contract’s terms are rarely negotiated.78 In-
stead, the weaker party is presented with a “take-it-or-leave it” form
contract referred to as a contract of adhesion.79 In contracts of adhe-
sion, the stronger party fixes the terms and the weaker party must
agree to those exact terms or forgo entering the contract.80 This coer-
cive atmosphere is exactly the case when upcoming college athletes
sign agreements with the institutions where they will play an NCAA
sport.81
The contract between a university and student-athlete is a con-
tract of adhesion with the university establishing the terms.82 Typi-
cally, before freshmen become official team members, they are
presented with a contract that governs the terms of their scholarships,
compliance with NCAA rules, waiver of publicity rights, and many
other aspects of their college careers.83 Student-athletes must sign the
agreement or forfeit their right to play for an NCAA member school,
leaving them with little choice but to conform.84 Even as rule-abiding
77. See Robert S. Alder & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
78. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconsciona-
bility, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203–04 (2003).
79. See Sean M. Hanlon, Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion: Has
the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41, 64–65 (2006).
80. See id.
81. See Thomas A. Baker III, John Grady & Jesse M. Rappole, Consent Theory as a Possi-
ble Cure for Unconscionable Terms in Student-Athlete Contracts, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 619
(2012).
82. See Meyer, supra note 20, at 234–35 (the recruit’s only bargaining power is the
decision to accept or refuse an offer).
83. See Baker, Grady & Rappole, supra note 81, at 619.
84. Id. But see Kendall K. Johnson, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of Publicity,
Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 25–29 (2012) (ar-
guing that students have a meaningful opportunity not to play for an NCAA school be-
cause other less favorable opportunities to play sports exist).
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competitors in NCAA sports, student-athletes hold little influence over
regulations that the NCAA adopts.85
Not only do student-athletes lack individual bargaining power,
they lack the ability to unite and bargain collectively against the uni-
versity. Even assuming that the massive number of students involved
could be effectively organized, a union-like bargaining atmosphere is
unachievable because student-athletes are not considered employees
afforded protection under the National Labor Relations Act.86 Even
more favorable to the university, NCAA rules bar student-athletes
from employing attorneys or sports agents to represent their interests
or negotiate a more equitable contract.87
Student-athletes’ only opportunity to exercise bargaining power
occurs when players initially choose the program that best suits their
aspirations.88 Within the parameters of permissible conduct set forth
in NCAA regulations, universities vigorously compete to recruit the
best student-athletes to agree to enroll at their institutions. After ath-
letes formally agree to attend an institution, all negotiating abilities
are lost with regard to scholarship awards and other accommoda-
tions.89 As was discussed earlier, athletes also lose their power to en-
force informal promises that were made by members of the
university’s athletic department during the recruitment process.90
A student-athlete’s fate remains uncertain even after he signs the
NLI before the school makes a definite scholarship award because the
NLI does not guarantee a minimum scholarship amount or playing
time.91 In fact, an athlete could sign the NLI only to discover that his
school “oversigned,” meaning that the institution has accepted more
NLIs from students than it has available scholarships, in which case
85. See Marc Jenkins, The United Student-Athletes of America: Should College Athletes Organ-
ize in Order to Protect Their Rights and Address the Ills of Intercollegiate Athletics?, 5 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRAC. 39, 46 (2003) (describing the student-athlete committee that reports to the
NCAA management council as “a passive representative of student-athletes and not a
strong voice for potential reform”).
86. Id.
87. See Oscar Robertson, Don’t Treat Players Like Gladiators, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Dont-Treat-Players-Like/130072/ (explain-
ing how students are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to negotiation, especially since
they are prohibited from hiring a lawyer).
88. Meyer, supra note 20, at 235.
89. See id.
90. See id.; supra Part II.B.
91. See Jonathan D. Bateman, When the Numbers Don’t Add Up: Oversigning in College
Football, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7, 7, 14 (2011).
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the player may receive no scholarship and must become a “walk-on”
member of the team.92
While NCAA regulations preclude student-athletes from the op-
portunity to negotiate the terms of their contracts with the institution,
star athletes may possess the necessary bargaining power to negotiate
a contract with their coach. In exchange for the star’s promise to play
at the coach’s university, a coach may be willing to promise to remain
at the institution for the duration of the student’s career. Of course,
the average college-bound player, eager to secure a Division I scholar-
ship, cannot exert the necessary bargaining power to negotiate such a
contract, because several other players with comparable abilities
would likely be willing to accept a scholarship and play for the school
without requiring a legally binding commitment from the coach.
However, a star player, who many schools strive to recruit, may be able
to secure such a promise.
Star players can exercise bargaining power over coaches because
most athletic programs covet players with extraordinary abilities.93
When students advantageously use their recruitment from competing
schools as leverage over the desired coach, a contract binding the
coach to remain at the university for four or more years becomes a
viable option. However, the student must secure the coach’s promise
to stay before the student signs the NLI; a coach has no incentive to
agree on a contract with a student who is already committed to the
program.
A contract between the star recruit and coach would not only aid
prospective players showcasing extraordinary talent, but would also
benefit average players who lack the necessary bargaining power as
well as students who have already matriculated to the university. If one
star recruit is able to secure a contract with the coach and ensure that
he remains at the university for a period of four or more years, every
teammate will benefit. If more players successfully negotiate these
contracts, the agreements will become easier to obtain, as more
coaches are forced to offer the contract in attempts to attract star
players.
92. See id. at 7–8.
93. See Meyer, supra note 20, at 227 (“Coaches travel all over the country in hopes of
recruiting a star athlete that can help their program achieve success.”).
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B. Bargaining Dynamics Between the Coach and University
The bargaining dynamic between coaches and universities begins
on a more equal footing because the university has a slightly greater
ability to negotiate than the student.94 The university’s goal is to se-
cure a provision in the coach’s employment contract where the coach
agrees to render unique sports services for the college. With this type
of clause in the contract, a breach of contract can, if the university
demonstrates irreparable harm, lead to a negative injunction to pre-
vent the coach from performing similar services for a competing
team. Universities have a strong incentive to seek to include these pro-
visions in coaching contracts since popular coaches generate a consid-
erable amount of revenue and the university wants to retain its star
players.
For many colleges, the success of football programs, both in
terms of winning games and generating revenue, depends on the
coach.95 Successful, lucrative coaches are valuable commodities af-
fording them great bargaining power over universities.96 Conse-
quently, coaches can exercise their bargaining power to avoid terms
that significantly restrain their ability to breach their contract. Anti-
trust laws preclude all Division I schools from agreeing to require the
provision as part of a coach’s employment contract.97 Such an agree-
ment would give universities nearly all of the bargaining power since
the coach would be unable to threaten employment with a rival school
as leverage. Although this type of collusion is prohibited, universities
will likely have to affect the bargaining dynamics to induce coaches to
agree to terms that would significantly increase the economic cost of a
contract breach to a coach and the new employer.
An emerging trend in college coaching contracts is to include
restrictive clauses, similar to unique service agreements, which limit
the coach’s ability to leave for another rival school during his contract
94. Compare Martin J. Greenberg, Representation of College Coaches in Contract Negotia-
tions, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 101 (1992) (universities routinely negotiate the terms of coach-
ing contracts), with supra notes 87-90 (students have little, if any, bargaining power with
coaches).
95. See Travis, supra note 56.
96. Michael P. Elkon, Enjoining Nick Saban: Non-Compete Agreements and College Football
Coaches, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP: NON-COMPETE AND TRADE SECRETS (Jan. 9, 2012, 11:09
AM), http://www.noncompetenews.com/post/2012/01/09/Enjoining-Nick-Saban-Non-
Compete-Agreements-and-College-Football-Coaches.aspx.
97. Cf. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (NCAA
rule limiting assistant coaches’ salaries violated Sherman Act).
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term.98 West Virginia University included these provisions in its past
several coaching contracts, including those agreements with Bob Hug-
gins, John Beilein, Rich Rodriguez and Bill Stewart.99 However, the
clauses in West Virginia’s coaching contracts differ from traditional
non-compete provisions because they prohibit the coaches from leav-
ing West Virginia for another Big East Conference school during the
term of their contracts,100 whereas traditional non-compete clauses in
employment contracts prevent the employee from going to work for a
competitor after the contract term expires.101 More universities are
attempting to insert these provisions, which strengthen universities’
legal options to prevent a coach from leaving for a competing school
before his contract term expires. Before he was dismissed, Arkansas’s
Coach Bobby Petrino agreed to a non-compete clause where he prom-
ised to remain loyal to the Razorbacks by refraining from coaching at
another Southeastern Conference West school for all but the last two
years of his contract term.102 His replacement, Coach John L. Smith,
agreed to a similar clause which will cost him $850,000 if he wishes to
leave before the end of his contract term.103
These provisions are illustrative of a trend but do not adequately
protect student-athletes; the harm to the athlete is the same whether
the coach leaves for a conference rival or other employer. Nor is an
$850,000 buyout sufficient to protect the student-athlete, as the only
programs to which a successful Arkansas head coach would be at-
tracted can easily afford to provide this compensation.
More coaches may be agreeable to these restrictive provisions if
the compensation and added perks, such as bonuses for bowl games,
escalator clauses which ensure that a coach remains near the top of
the highest paid coaches in the industry, and use of private planes and
cars, are attractive enough. Even though the NCAA prohibits colleges
from paying players, despite the ample revenue that student-athletes
generate, colleges can still protect athletes by using the revenue to
98. See Kevin Scarbinsky, The Next Big Thing in Contracts: Will More Coaching Deals In-
clude Non-Compete Clauses?, ALABAMA (Aug. 29, 2010, 3:15 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/
index.ssf/2010/08/next_big_thing_will_more_coach.html.
99. Jack Bogaczyk, Holgorsen’s Deal Sweet for Coach, Not WVU, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL:
WVU SPORTS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://dailymail.com/Sports/WVUSports/201112190104.
100. See id.
101. See C.T. Drechsler, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment Con-
tract, As Affected By Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R. 2d 15, 24 (1955).
102. See Scarbinsky, supra note 98.
103. See Matt Jones, Smith’s Contract Short and Sweet, THE SLOPHOUSE (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://blogs.nwaonline.com/slophouse/2012/04/23/smith-gets-his-chance/ (last visited
May 15, 2013).
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compensate coaches for agreeing on unique service provisions. Col-
leges are more likely to receive longer, binding commitments from
coaches if they can offer more compensation in exchange.
There is another important element in the bargaining dynamic
that would exist if colleges and their coaches could credibly promise
that the coach would remain during a student-athlete’s tenure (or
would do so absent specified circumstances). Coaches that resisted
binding loyalty promises would face a serious recruiting disadvantage.
For example, consider the case of Brian Kelly, who left the University
of Cincinnati to accept the head-coaching job at the University of No-
tre Dame after Notre Dame paid a relatively modest and affordable
buyout. Would Kelly have been able to attract the top athletes that
made Bearcat football so successful if rival schools had coaches who
had signed contracts allowing student-athletes to enforce negative
injunctions?
C. Dynamics Require Contracts Enforceable by Student-Athletes,
not just Universities
Even if a university had the bargaining power to protect itself
from all losses resulting from a coach’s resignation, contract provi-
sions are only as good as the university’s willingness to fully enforce
their contract rights. Typically, the ultimate decision regarding a uni-
versity’s approach to a coach’s desire to breach a contract to move to a
“better” school lies in the hands of the university president. In the
academic world, college officials are used to “one way” contracts.
Professors are typically given life tenure but are free to leave for an-
other school whenever they choose. In the world of professional
sports, coaches—like players—are typically held to their promises. At-
titudes such as “we wouldn’t want to keep a coach here if he wasn’t
happy”104 often lead university presidents to approaches that a profes-
sional club owner would never adopt. Because big-time college
coaches are compensated in a manner more akin to a professional
coach than a typical professor, treating them like professional coaches
seems appropriate. Still, even if the terms of an employment contract
could permit the university to secure a negative injunction barring
their coach from providing his unique services to another college
104. As a faculty member of a university’s athletic board, Professor Ross responded to
this observation by the university’s chancellor by asking the board if they could imagine
George Steinbrenner releasing a Yankees player who had exceeded expectations from a
multi-year contract, when the player perceived he could get more money with another
team, on the grounds that the player “wasn’t happy.” The chancellor did not reply.
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team, college presidents rarely take advantage of the rights afforded
them by law: to threaten litigation for tortious interference with con-
tractual relations if another university’s president or athletic director
approached the coach for a new position.105 Thus, student-athletes
need some means to enforce these contracts themselves.
IV. Validity of Contracts Under NCAA Rules
Although a contract in which the coach promises to remain at the
university is legally and equitably enforceable, enforcement is mean-
ingless if NCAA Bylaws preclude either the agreement or its enforce-
ment. The principal issue in analyzing conformity of these provisions
with NCAA regulations relates to the NCAA rule precluding student-
athletes from receiving “extra benefits” from their athletic participa-
tion not available to other students, unless specifically authorized by
the NCAA. This Part concludes that the contract provisions discussed
above should not constitute an impermissible extra benefit.
The NCAA governs the operation of intercollegiate athletics
through its primary function of developing regulations.106 The activi-
ties of both students and coaches are heavily monitored by the
NCAA.107 The NCAA Bylaws include three distinctive goals relevant to
this issue: (1) a philosophical commitment to the amateur ideal that
participation in intercollegiate athletics is primarily motivated by the
physical, mental, and social benefits that the student-athletes expect
to derive; (2) regulations that maintain a “clear line of demarcation”
distinguishing intercollegiate athletics from professional sports; and
(3) regulations designed to prevent member schools from behavior
that will result in what the member schools perceive as an unfair com-
petitive advantage.108 In furtherance of these goals, the NCAA prohib-
its student-athletes from receiving any type of compensation or “extra
105. See, e.g., Darren Heitner, Kent State’s Buyout Clause and Tortious Interference Claims,
CHANGELEGAL (May 15, 2011), http://changelegal.com/2011/05/15/kent-states-buyout-
clause-and-tortious-interference-claims/; Benjamin Clark, Coaching Changes Lead to Lawsuit,
IOWA LAW BLOG (July 28, 2010), http://www.iowa-lawblog.com/2010/07/articles/general-
law-1/coaching-changes-lead-to-lawsuit/. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: IN-
TENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT BY THIRD PERSON § 766 (1979).
106. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 12:3 (2011); see also
NCAA CONST. art. I, § 1.2(h), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 1.
107. Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for A New Game
Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487 (1995).
108. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 16, art. 12, § 12.01.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 16, at 61; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 1; Sarah M. Konsky, An Antitrust
Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2003).
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benefit” in return for their participation in intercollegiate athletics,
other than those benefits expressly authorized by the NCAA.109
Occasionally, coaches succumb to the intense pressure to win and
run afoul of NCAA regulations.110 As an added measure of enforce-
ment, the NCAA requires that all coaching contracts contain a provi-
sion stating that a coach who violates any NCAA rule is subject to
disciplinary action by the NCAA.111 The university is also required to
incorporate the NCAA rules into coaching contracts, meaning that a
coach who violates an NCAA rule has also breached his employment
contract with the university.112 Among sanctions available to the
NCAA Infractions Committee is a ruling that bars any other NCAA
member school from hiring a coach found guilty of violating NCAA
regulations.113 Although a student-athlete would gain no direct mone-
tary benefit from an agreement with their coach to remain at the insti-
tution throughout the student’s career, all parties must exercise
precaution to avoid an unwanted violation of the NCAA rules.
No NCAA rule expressly prohibits the formation of a contract be-
tween a coach and player in which the coach promises not to leave the
university during the student’s career. The “Extra Benefit Rule” for-
bids prospective student-athletes from receiving any “financial aid or
other benefits” from representatives of the institution and its athletic
program.114 Specifically, the NCAA strictly prohibits coaches or other
members of the athletic department from giving players any type of
monetary bonus, including cash, equipment, clothing, loan money,
housing, sponsorship, or reimbursement for academic expenses.115 If
NCAA officials were to conclude that a contract between a coach and
109. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 16, at art. 12, § 12.01.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 16, at 61; Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept En-
dorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by Unethical
Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371,
372–77 (2012). Formally, the NCAA’s ban on paying players in ways other than specifically
approved by their rules is no different than the NBA’s similar ban on paying players other
than in accordance with their salary cap rules! An analysis of the NCAA’s controversial
rules strictly limiting pay to players is beyond the scope of this article.
110. See generally Michael S. Selvaggi, The College v. The Coach, 3 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
221, 222–25 (1993) (noting coaches who have blatantly disregarded NCAA regulations and
explaining how the “tremendous emphasis placed on athletic success” fuels the temptation
to violate NCAA rules).
111. See id. at 226–27.
112. See id.
113. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 16, at art. 19, § 19.5.2(k), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 16, at 323.
114. Id. at art. 13, § 13.2.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 100.
115. Id.
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student which includes the coach’s promise to remain at the university
constitutes a prohibited “extra benefit” to a prospective student ath-
lete, it would run afoul of the NCAA regulations, because any “bene-
fit” that is not expressly authorized is not permissible.
Allowing coaches to enter into binding promises with student-ath-
letes furthers the NCAA’s goals, and it would be unfortunate if NCAA
officials construed “extra benefit” so broadly as to include this prom-
ise. The applicable rule is designed to prohibit schools from inducing
players with financial awards and similar monetary incentives. The
items specifically prohibited under the rule are all tangible things of
substantial cash value, whereas a coach’s agreement to continue in his
coaching capacity during the player’s career cannot be measured in
dollars (indeed, this is why equity courts would enforce the promise
with a negative injunction!).
While a monetary gift presumably persuades a student-athlete to
attend a particular institution that the recruit would not choose ab-
sent the gift, a contract with the university’s coach promotes fairness
in the recruitment process by protecting the athlete’s interests after
he has decided to attend a particular institution. The coach attracts
the student and the contract makes it more likely that the student-
athlete’s collegiate experience will be what the school promised.
Unlike tangible items of monetary value, which constitute extra
benefits, a coach’s promise to remain at the university furthers the
three relevant NCAA policies that underlie the ban on impermissible
extra benefits.116 While monetary gifts are inconsistent with amateur-
ism principles, among the legitimate “educational” benefits that are
supposed to motivate student-athletes is the opportunity to have their
competitive talents honed by a particularly effective coach, and more
generally by the type of program run by that coach. While monetary
gifts are likewise inconsistent with maintaining a clear line between
intercollegiate and professional sports, allowing the athlete to ensure
that a chosen coach will remain is of course foreign to a professional
team and a paid player. Finally, enforcing these promises will likely
promote a level playing field, rather than hinder it. The coaching car-
ousel is generally an upward cycle, which harms well-run, rising pro-
grams and benefits under-performing traditional powers.
Student-athletes are not parties to a contract between the coach
and university; therefore, they have no right to enforce the agreement
unless they are intended third-party beneficiaries. For students to be-
116. See supra note 109.
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come intended third-party beneficiaries, the school and coach must
make it clear that performance of the agreement is intended to bene-
fit the university’s student-athletes.117 Otherwise, the players lack
standing to legally enforce the contract in case of a breach. If a coach
were to breach a contract where student-athletes are intended benefi-
ciaries, both the university and the athletes may seek damages as well
as pursue available equitable relief.118
Just as a student-coach contract should not constitute an “extra
benefit” under NCAA regulations, NCAA regulators should permit an
express provision in the coach’s contract with the university that
designates student-athletes as third party beneficiaries. Although mon-
etary damages (or a monetary settlement to avoid equitable relief)
would likely constitute “pay” prohibited under NCAA regulations,119
allowing student-athletes to secure a negative injunction would, as
noted above, further NCAA goals rather than defeat them.
Conclusion
Creating legally enforceable contracts to hold coaches to
promises to remain at a school during the career of a student-athlete
is the most effective manner in which student-athletes can shield their
professional careers from the harm that erupts when coaches leave
their universities. These beneficial contracts can be achieved in two
ways. First, star players can and should step forward and utilize their
coveted abilities to negotiate contracts with their coaches. Agreements
which ensure that a coach remains committed to his respective univer-
sity throughout the athlete’s career would not only help players with
extraordinary talents, it would benefit the entire team. Second, uni-
versities have a strong business incentive to include unique service
provisions in coaches’ employment contracts. These agreements en-
sure that the school remains competitive in the college sports market
under the leadership of its current coach. Both contracts are attaina-
ble under current bargaining dynamics.
Each agreement meets the basic requirements to create a legally
enforceable contract. A clause in the coach’s employment contract re-
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: INTENDED AND INCIDENTAL BENEFI-
CIARIES § 302 (1981).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CREATION OF DUTY TO BENEFICIARY
§ 304 (1981).
119. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 16, at art. 12, § 13.1.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 16, at 62 (prohibiting players from being compensated for participating in
NCAA athletics and stipulating that players who are compensated will lose their “amateur”
status).
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citing that his services are unique would not raise serious antitrust
concerns if the term was the product of a competitive market for
coaching services. Given the current NCAA regulations, it is unlikely
that either contract is impermissible because neither agreement per-
suades recruits to play for a particular school by offering them mone-
tary benefits nor do they reward current players with financial
compensation for their sports services.
Finally, should a coach breach his contract with a student or the
university, equitable relief is an available remedy. These contracts can-
not force a coach to carry out his duties throughout the contract term,
but they come as close as legally possible to producing the same result.
If a coach is prohibited from rendering his services to any other team,
his only option in the NCAA world is to remain employed with his
current university, which would ultimately save student-athletes’ fu-
tures from irreparable harm.
736 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
